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Introduction
The time has come to put "look and feel" to rest. By its very nature,
the term resists meaningful definition and contributes inevitably to fuzzy,
over-generalized analysis. Wherever the term is found, it is likely that
someone is pushing a vastly expanded notion of copyright protection
under which infringement may be found because one work reminds view-
ers of a second work. While such an approach may be appropriate in an
unfair competition analysis, it is inappropriate for copyright purposes.
This does not mean that copyright protection is or should be un-
available for all of the elements of a computer program's "look and feel."
Quite the contrary. It is clear, however, that the term incorporates dis-
parate elements, only some of which are protectable. Indeed, certain ele-
ments incorporated in "look and feel" constitute about as good a
candidate for the unprotectable idea of a computer program as we are
likely to find.
By its very nature, "look and feel" contributes to treating all of these
disparate elements in an equivalent manner. The term is vague and over-
broad, and it leads to an overly expansive analysis that is inconsistent
with fundamental principles of copyright law. "Look and feel" should be
eliminated, and replaced by a more focused analysis that recognizes the
significant differences among various "look and feel" elements.
I
The Origin of "Look and Feel"
The problems with "look and feel" are no accident. Both the con-
cept and the term were deliberately designed to be amorphous and ill-
defined, so as to contribute to greatly expanded copyright protection for
elements of a computer program's user interface, which would not other-
wise appear subject to such protection. I know, because I was there
when it happened.
"Look and feel" originated as a legal concept and term of art in the
mind of Jack Russo, a Palo Alto, California, attorney specializing in
computer law. The underlying concept was born when Apple Computer
asked for help in protecting its Macintosh user interface against competi-
tive products. Although existing case law made it clear that the elabo-
rate screen displays of video games were subject to copyright protection,
it had not yet been established that the less elaborate displays of more
traditional applications programs would be protected. The display of a
spreadsheet, for example, could conceivably be analogized to a "blank
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form" and denied copyrightability under Baker v. Selden.' The denial of
copyright protection to "input formats" in Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co.2 also created some doubt on this score, because
relatively simple screen displays consist of little more than formats for
the input and display of information.
"Graphical user interfaces," such as those utilized in the Macintosh,
fell somewhere between video games and blank forms. Thus, a good ar-
gument could be made that even if a more traditional applications pro-
gram user interface were not protectable, a graphical user interface
would be.
It was Mr. Russo's idea, however, that copyright protection should
extend beyond the visual expression created by a computer program to
cover also what he perceived as the most valuable aspect of a mass-mar-
keted computer program: the "relationship" between the program and
the user. He believed that the user of a computer program develops a
strong subjective impression of the program, to the point where the pro-
gram develops its own "feel" to the user, separate and apart from the
visual expression. One element of that "feel" includes the functions per-
formed by the program; another includes such things as which keys per-
form which operations.
In essence, however, the "feel" of a computer program, at least as
originally conceived, transcends the individual elements of the user inter-
face and incorporates the overall impression made by the program on a
user. As a matter of definition, even two computer programs that con-
tain very different user interfaces can "look and feel" the same if the
overall impression conveyed by the products is similar.
In 1985, Mr. Russo asked me to co-author an article on the subject
of copyright protection for user interfaces of non-video game computer
programs. It was during the course of discussions relating to that article
that the first debates took place over the term "look and feel" and over
the underlying concept. While comfortable with copyright protection
over the visual elements of a user interface, I found it difficult to under-
stand fully either the meaning of "look and feel" or the boundaries of the
concept. Indeed, it appeared that the whole doctrine was an attempt to
pull unfair competition principles into copyright protection for computer
programs. Moreover, the amorphous nature of the terminology made it
clear that it could be applied to virtually any aspect of a computer pro-
gram, thereby rendering it useless as an analytical term except for pur-
poses of confusing the issue in order to obtain broader protection.
1. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
2. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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At the time, Mr. Russo and I disagreed over whether the article
should concern copyright protection for a computer program's "look and
feel" (his term) or a program's "user interface" (my term). I argued that
"user interface" was a concrete term, defined as the visual and auditory
elements by which a computer program communicates with a user, and
that these elements could be subject to copyright protection, as opposed
to the vague "gestalt" or "feel" of a program. Whenever I got my hands
on the article, I simply replaced the term "look and feel" with "user
interface." Mr. Russo changed it back when it was his turn to revise.
This debate was settled, and the term "look and feel" introduced to
the wider legal community, when Mr. Russo submitted for publication
the final version of the article. It ran in the February 1985 Computer
Lawyer as "Copyright in the 'Look and Feel' of Computer Software."3
The ensuing years have done nothing to convince me that "look and
feel" is of any use, either as a phrase or as a concept. Indeed, I believe
the problems inherent in "look and feel" are directly attributable to its
original conception as a generalized term, designed to cover a variety of
very different elements of a computer program's user interface.
Given the broad nature of "look and feel," I do not believe that it
can contribute to any meaningful analysis of what is copyrightable and
noncopyrightable in a computer program. Instead, analysis should pro-
ceed by taking the various elements incorporated in "look and feel" indi-
vidually and determining which may legitimately be subject to copyright
protection. Those elements include the user-visible set of functions, the
visual user interface, and non-visible user interface elements. Although
interrelated, each of these concepts is conceptually separate and must be
analyzed differently.
This approach, it should be noted, is directly (and deliberately) con-
trary to the original philosophy of "look and feel," which sought to treat
all of the elements that contribute to a user's impression of a computer
program as part of an overall "gestalt." "Look and feel" is a flawed
concept precisely because it leads to treating distinct elements as if they
were similar. It is only by rigorously dividing the concept and analyzing
its elements separately that meaningful analysis is possible.
II
Separate Elements of Look and Feel
The "look and feel" of a computer program includes at least three
conceptually different elements: the visual user interface, the set of user-
3. Jack Russo & Douglas K. Derwin, Copyright in the "Look and Feel" of Computer
Software, 2 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (Feb. 1985).
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visible functions, and non-visible elements of the user interface. Each of
these elements should be treated separately under copyright law, because
they run the gamut from the clearly protectable to the clearly
unprotectable.
A. Visual User Interface
The "visual user interface" of a computer program consists of the
visual elements by which the program communicates to a user.4 Thus,
the term incorporates some, but not all, of the elements of a computer
program's user interface as a whole. The correspondence between partic-
ular commands and keys on the keyboard, for example, is part of a pro-
gram's user interface, but is not an element of the visual user interface.
It is difficult to dispute that copyright law protects screen displays.
Indeed, it is somewhat difficult to understand how this proposition could
ever have been subject to much debate. Virtually all modem user inter-
faces are conceptually indistinguishable from audiovisual works. Screen
displays consist of a large number of stored images, which are called up
in rapid progression to form what appears to be a single work.
There are two main distinctions between screen displays and tradi-
tional audiovisual works: (1) computer program screen displays nor-
mally are much less sophisticated visually than traditional audiovisual
works; and (2) computer program screen displays are ordinarily subject
to manipulation by the user.- Neither distinction should be sufficient to
divest copyright protection.
Issues are presented when a visual user interface is simple and con-
tains little graphic content. In such cases, the visual user interface may
be uncopyrightable, either because it consists of nothing more than a
blank form or simply because it contains insufficient expression to satisfy
the requirements of copyrightability. Drawing the line between a copy-
rightable and uncopyrightable user interface, however, presents issues
that are indistinguishable from those presented by very simple literary
works. The existence of some works that are unprotectable obviously
4. It should be noted that the visual and communicative elements of a computer program
are not limited to the expression contained on a computer screen. In many programs, commu-
nication with the user is mainly carried out through printed forms. This is particularly true of
older, batch programming products. Although limitations on the graphic elements that can be
incorporated into a paper print-out ordinarily mean that these print-outs are not as visually
sophisticated as the contents of most screen-driven interfaces, the fact that a user interface is
presented on paper, rather than on a computer screen, is irrelevant to whether visual elements
of the interface should be protectable.
5. These distinctions are becoming less meaningful as time goes by, and it is likely that
they will disappear entirely within the foreseeable future. Technologies such as multimedia,
virtual reality and digital-video interfaces are blurring the line between computer program user
interfaces and audiovisual works, a trend that will certainly continue.
1993]
cannot mean that the category as a whole is not subject to copyright
protection.6
Thus, copyright protection is clearly available to the visual user in-
terface element of "look and feel." The relatively simple and constrained
nature of many visual user interfaces may, of course, raise merger doc-
trine and scope of protection questions. As a generic matter, however,
visual user interfaces indisputably fall within the categories of works that
are subject to copyright protection.
B. User-Visible Function Set
The second element incorporated into "look and feel" consists of the
set of functions made available to a user by a computer program. In
analyzing this element, it is necessary to distinguish carefully the func-
tions performed by the underlying computer program from the visual
elements used to convey the functions to the user.
The set of functions made available to a user by a computer program
consists of those operations that the program will allow the user to per-
form. A word processing program, for example, will ordinarily allow the
user to: (1) add text to the end of a document; (2) insert text in the
middle of a document; (3) delete text from the document; and (4) move
text from one location to another. Those operations are part of the set of
functions made available to the user.
Although these "user-visible" functions are carried out by the un-
derlying computer program, the functionality of the program itself in-
volves more detailed operations that are not visible to the user. For
example, in order to add text to the end of a document, the computer
program must decide where to store the information in its memory, and
which internal symbols to use to describe elements such as paragraph
indentations and the end of a line. Those functional attributes of the
computer program may be protectable by copyright law, but they are
distinct from the user-visible functions, because the user ordinarily has
no knowledge of the underlying computer program's details. Thus, the
user-visible function set consists of those operations that the user is al-
lowed to perform, as distinguished from the functional aspects of the un-
derlying program that carry out those operations.
6. Whether the screen displays created by a computer program are treated as an element
of the underlying program, or as a separate copyrightable work, is a matter of semantic quib-
bling. If the screen displays are treated as a separate copyrightable work, then copying the
screen displays will constitute infringement if they contain sufficient expression to qualify for
copyright protection. If the screen displays are treated merely as an element of the underlying
program, then copying the screen displays will constitute infringement if they contain sufficient
expression to qualify as a qualitatively significant portion of the computer program as a whole.
In the real world, the results will be identical, regardless of which path is chosen.
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The user-visible function set must also be distinguished from the
methodology used to convey the functions and from the results of opera-
tions to the user. Using the examples of user-visible functions given
above, a word processing program might include the following com-
mands: "Add," "Insert, .... Delete," and "Move." The command names
are distinct from the underlying functions, because different names could
be used to describe the same functions. This distinction may be impor-
tant, because the fact that the set of command names may be copyright-
able (subject, of course, to the merger doctrine) does not mean that the
set of underlying functions is necessarily subject to copyright protection.
Moreover, in a computer program, the commands might be listed in a
menu bar at the top or bottom of the screen. This feature constitutes an
element of the visible user interface, and, as such, may be protectable.
Once again, however, the set of functions must be distinguished from the
method used to convey those functions to the-user. Copyright protection
over one does not necessarily imply protection over the other.
In analyzing copyright protection over the set of user-visible func-
tions, the concept must be treated separately from the underlying pro-
gram functionality as well as from the user interface, by which the
commands may be invoked. The fact that both the underlying program
functionality and the command menu display may be copyrightable does
not mean that the underlying set of functions either is or should be pro-
tected by copyright law.
In my opinion, the set of user-visible functions should not be subject
to copyright protection. This element of a computer program seems the
most suitable for definition as the "idea" of the program, because it con-
sists of those operations that the program allows the user to accomplish.
This is distinct from the programming that carries out those operations,
as well as from the visual elements by which the program communicates
to the user.
Treating the set of user-visible functions as the idea of the computer
program' is consistent with recent opinions rejecting the Third Circuit's
conclusion in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.'
Whelan held that the idea of a computer program consists of the most
general description of the program's function, with everything else con-
sisting of protectable expression. The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has re-
cently held that exact copying of an extremely short routine contained in
a computer program was allowable under the merger doctrine, because
the programming contained in that routine was the only way to carry out
7. This could also constitute the idea of the program's user interface, to the extent that
the user interface is treated as a separate copyrightable work.
8. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
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the function of the routine.9 Such an analysis would be impossible under
the Whelan approach, because, under Whelan, the function performed by
a portion of the program would necessarily constitute expression.' °
The set of user-visible functions seems to be the best mechanism
available for separating what a program does from how it does it. The
"what versus how" question is well-suited for distinguishing the level of
copying that promotes competition from the level that retards innova-
tion: the level that promotes competition will be defined as the copying
of "ideas"; the level of copying that retards it will be defined as the copy-
ing of "expression."
C. Non-Visual User Interface Elements
Non-visual user interface elements are those characteristics of the
program that are perceivable to the user, but that do not correspond
either to visual or programming elements. For example, a popular word
processing program for IBM-compatible computers, WordPerfect, uses
the Fl function key as a means of immediately terminating most opera-
tions. Thus, if a user has blocked out certain text for deletion, and then
decides not to proceed with the operation, the Fl key may be used to
cancel the deletion. Fl can also be used to cancel a variety of other
operations.
The Fl key is not part of the visual user interface, because it does
not appear on the screen. Thus, this feature of the program cannot be
protected as part of the screen output. Protection must come, if at all, as
a result of protecting the underlying computer program, which necessar-
ily contains programming related to the correspondence between F1 and
cancellation.
If the set of user-visible functions is defined as the idea of a com-
puter program, then the non-visual user interface elements of necessity
would constitute protectable expression. Such elements, however, exist
at a relatively high level of abstraction, because it will ordinarily be possi-
ble to create the same non-visual user interface elements through the use
of very different computer programs. Thus, protection of non-visual user
interface elements should be relatively narrow, requiring a very high de-
gree of similarity, if not identical copying. In addition, care should be
taken to avoid protection of standard or commonplace elements.
9. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993) (Order Amending
Opinion, filed January 6, 1993).
10. See also Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Plains Cotton
Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987).
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III
Conclusion
To the extent that "look and feel" has ever had any utility as a term
or as an analytical concept, that utility no longer exists. The term resists
meaningful definition, and its use contributes to overbroad generaliza-
tions that support theories of protection inconsistent with fundamental
principles of copyright law.
Abandoning the term, however, does not mean abandoning protec-
tion over all "look and feel" elements. The visual user interface is clearly
subject to copyright protection. The non-visual user interface may also
be subject to protection as a part of the underlying computer program.
The set of user-visible functions, on the other hand, appears best
suited as a definition of the unprotectable idea of the program. At the
least, this concept may aid in defining the distinction between a pro-
gram's function and the manner in which it carries out its function. This
in turn may help to define the boundaries between idea and expression.
As a term and as a concept, "look and feel" does not help in analysis
of this type, but instead retards it. The term should be abandoned.
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